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When I approached the World Bank a few years ago
about a conference and volume on the Pioneers in
Development, I could think of no better organiser and
co-editor than Dudley Seers - himself a pioneer. We
were to meet in June, 1983 in Washington and begin
editing the Pioneers when he arrived ill from his last
mission to Fiji. His final writings were on the plane
and related to the editing we were about to do, and to
activities that he was next to undertake in Trinidad
and Shanghai after Washington.
To the end, it was characteristic for Dudley Seers to be
planning for the future: the present dissolved into the
future. This personal zest and future orientation
carried over to his writings and to the work of IDS. In
that spirit, I should now like to look back in order to
look forward about a subject that concerned Dudley:
what have development economists accomplished
since those pioneering days? Do development
economists matter?
In his Nobel lecture, Theodore Schultz [1980] stated:
'Most of the people in the world are poor, so if we
knew the economics of being poor we would know
much of the economics that really matters'. I would
agree that the economics of poverty is the economics
that really matters. But do development economists
matter?
Early on, Dudley had something to say about this
question. He wrote about 'Why visiting economists
fail' (1962) and about 'The limitations of the special
case' (1967). While urging that 'the help that
governments need most desperately is advice on how
to stimulate development', he believed that 'con-
ventional economics does not have a great deal to offer
by way of useful advice'. He stressed the relativism of
economics - the danger in transferring economic
propositions uncritically from the special case of the
developed industrial economies to the newly emergent
nations. And he stated that 'economists are of very
little use working on the problems of underdeveloped
economies, until they have done so for many years,
and then only if they are unusually adaptable'.
Now, some 20 years later, can we say a little more on
this subject? There is no question that there have been
some remarkable achievements in the development
record over the past four decades. Never before in
history has the condition of the poor of the world
improved so much in such a short period. Given the
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rise in various indices of development, whether
monetary or non-monetary, one can certainly
contend that development economists must have
mattered for realising the achievements in the
development record. The success stories have not
depended on a country's initial conditions but rather
on the adoption of appropriate policies. In some
countries at some times, economic advisers have been
influential. In many other countries, however, the
development record has been disappointing.
Appropriate policies have not been adopted, and
development economists have not been listened to.
Preparatory to my initial experience of lecturing in a
developing country - Pakistan in 1958 - my mentor
Emile Despres, who had been on the first Ford
Foundation missïon to Pakistan, wrote me these
words of advice:
Economics in Pakistan is in pretty sorry shape.
Among the academics, economics is conceived of
as a sort of esoteric lore having nothing to do with
anything in the world of actuality. They would like
you to pitch your lectures at a very fancy, highbrow
level, using the most recherché terminology and the
fanciest diagrams and dropping as many names in
your discourse as possible. I hope you will do just
the opposite of what the customers want. Stress the
problem-solving value of economics as its only real
justification. Keep it very elementary. Stress that
modern economics is chiefly concerned with the
economics of advanced economies, and that
although it is useful in dealing with problems of
underdeveloped countries, it has to be applied with
discretion, amending some assumptions and all
that.
Despite, the attempt in the Five Year plan to
emphasise the need for changes in administrative
practice, agricultural extension, and other sweeping
institutional changes, along with improvements in
technology, there is a tendency in Pakistan, as in
India and I suspect other countries, to regard the
public investment programme as the heart of the
plan. Development is thought of, first and
foremost, as investment, I am sure that this
emphasis is wrong in Pakistan's case. Government
controls have the economy in a straightjacket, to a
much greater degree than in India, and the
misallocation of resources is extreme. The political
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situation, of course, is one of marked weakness, but
the civil servants could perhaps do a good deal if
they would, despite the weakness at the political
level.
Despres was then already concerned about the
disadvantages of import substituting industrialisation,
the persistence of unemployment and underemploy-
ment, and inequality in income and wealth. But such
concerns were not then - and are not now - being
listened to in many of the less developed countries.
Why do development economists continue to be
ignored?
Since the 1960s there has been a neoclassical
resurgence in development economics. But more than
this is needed if the disappointments in the
development record are to be overcome. A major
disappointment has been that the poorest of the poor
nations have made the least progress: neoclassical
prescriptions are not likely to solve the structural
problems of these countries.
Nor are such prescriptions effective for overcoming
other disappointments in the development record:
namely, the high rates of population growth, the
pervasiveness of unemployment and underemploy-
ment, the increasing number of people living in
absolute poverty, the inequality in distribution, and
the lack of political development. If development
economists are to matter more, they must give more
attention to these problems. And to do this, they will
have to go beyond neoclassical economics to more
analysis of disequilibria, the dynamics of structural
change, and the incorporation of non-economic
factors.
Some known neoclassical prescriptions, however,
might be effective and helpful. Some other policies
that go beyond neoclassical economics are also
endorsed by most development economists. From the
evolution of development thought and the policy
lessons of the last four decades, many development
economists would now agree on a set of appropriate
policies. My central question thus becomes: even when
economists do know how to put things right, and they
do agree on the remedial policy, why are they still not
listened to? Why are these policies not adopted?
The answer may simply be that the economist cannot
even present his advice to the policy maker. Perhaps
the country's ultimate decision maker would say, as
Dr. Banda of Malawi has stated:
I am the boss here. Why beat about the bush? I am
the boss. I am responsible for this country, the
welfare of the ordinary people in the villages, men
and women, boys and girls. Whatever the rules and
regulations, practices and usage, etiquette in other
countries . . . whatever the etiquette between the
officials and politicians, between Permanent
Secretaries and their Ministers, whatever the usage
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in other countries - not here, not here! I am the
boss. I am responsible.
A leader. . . who depends on others, even his own
officials or outside experts, is a prisoner. And I
never want to be a prisoner on any subject, not one.
T accept advice from my so-called experts, so-called
advisers, so-called specialists only when their
advice agrees with my own ideas and not at any
other time.
Therefore, we do not permit any, not even the
World Bank, to tell us what to do because we know
what we want [Pryor 1986].
But this statement can be discounted as indulgence in a
bit of dramatic hyperbole. For Malawi has established
an excellent group of economists in government, and
Dr. Banda takes pride in the growth of the University
of Malawi and its graduation of a sizeable number of
economists, and the World Bank's policy-based
lending to Malawi has been significant.
Nonetheless, even if the economist can present his
case, there may still be a lack of understanding by the
policy maker. I would not, however, attribute this to
demographic considerations and lack of higher
education in small developing countries, as does
Arnold On the contrary, the burden must
lie on the economist as adviser to be understandable
and persuasive in the giving of his advice. Only too
often advice is too subtle or too complicated to be
persuasive.
In minimising Ricardo's contribution to the repeal of
the Corn Laws, George Stigler states that Ricardo's
passage on Portugal and England and wine and cloth
is beyond the comprehension of ordinary citizens, and
that after reading this passage the import that the
layman is likely to embrace is not the English theory of
free trade but a bottle of Portuguese wine [Stigler
1976:58]. Today, however, Ricardo's three paragraphs
remain the essence of simplicity and clarity in
comparison with Bhagwati's survey article on
comparative advantage [Bhagwati 1969] or Ethier's
exposition of higher dimensional factor endowments
theory [Ethier 1974]. Rare indeed is the policy maker
in any country who can understand the modern theory
of comparative advantage.
Not only are policy prescriptions presented to the
policy maker in too complicated a form - they also
frequently defy any feasible application. Where is
Harberger contends that in a typical small developing country of
6 mn people, less than 1.2 mn would now he over the age of4O, and
of these less than one per cent would typically have received any
higher education. 'Those who take fully to heart the razor-sharp
logic of economics will be at an inherent disadvantage relative to
those who feel comfortable with a world view that is at once fuzzier.
but more flexible, softer, but more malleable .
. . The smaller the
leadership elite, the more are characteristics peculiar to it -
including its own cliques, factions and rivalries - likely to play a
dominant role in defining pressures and points of resistance'
[Harberger 1988:345, 353].
there any government that can compute and
administer the lump sum and non-distortionary taxes
and subsidies of neoclassical welfare economics? For
most developing countries, even the machinery for
direct income taxes is rudimentary. While the
economist only too often deals with the first-best
optimal policy, the government must live with the
second best or third best in any hierarchy of policy
choices. As Dudley Seers pointed out, visiting
economists often fail because they are unable to make
the necessary appraisal of the socioeconomic structure
and the capacity of the administration in the
developing country [Seers 1962:3311.
Moreover, the political calendar has a short time
horizon, whereas the economist considers longer term
tendencies. But as Keynes observed:
The long run is a misleading guide to current
affairs. In the long run we are all dead. Economists
set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in
tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when
the storm is long past the ocean is flat again
[Keynes 1923]
These explanations, however, have too much of an
ad hoc character and are not entirely satisfying. Can
we offer a more systematic explanation of why policy
makers do what they do? For this purpose we turn to
the insights of the 'new political economy'.
The New Political Economy
By the 'new political economy' I mean the use of
neoclassical economic methodology to explain the
political determinants of policy making. Such a
positive theory of political behaviour does not assume
that government is an exogenous force but is instead
endogenous. and the policies it institutes can be
explained by such neoclassical concepts as optimi-
sation, marginalism, equilibrium. The analysis
attempts to disaggregate and operationalise the 'state',
and is composed of various strands of thought: public
choice, collective choice, transaction costs and
property rights, rent seeking and directly unproductive
activities. Political rationality is postulated. In the
terminology of game theory, forms of political
analysis involve identifying (a) the game form - the
players, their strategies and the extensive form of the
game, and (b) identifying the preferences of the
participants and institutional actors. In this analysis
the government cannot be viewed as a Platonic
Guardian nor a benevolent dictator achieving Pareto
efficiency or maximising a social welfare function. No
longer can the development economist refer to a
Pigou-Meade or Bergson-Samuelson type of planner.2
Denying that governments are the agencies of public
interest, the new political economy has gone on to
designate a typology of government that focuses on
the state as a Leviathan or predatory state, or as
factional, or as bureaucratic. The Leviathan model
interprets government as seeking profits and rents
from the activities in which it engages. Such an
objective explains the imposition of quantitative
restrictions, tariffs, bulk buying, controls over
wholesale and retail trade. Another objective of
Leviathan is likely to be net revenue maximisation. In
this predatory view of the nature of government, the
state preys on its citizens, with an insatiable appetite
for revenue that it consumes for its own sake [Findlay
and Wilson 1987:290].
Findlay and Wilson remind us, however, that the state
may also be productive. The provision of public goods
(security, law and order, irrigation, roads) raises the
productivity of the economy above the level that
woul J exist without the state (anarchy). Viewing the
state as an institution that is intrinsically both
productive and potentially predatory in character,
Findlay and Wilson attempt to capture this dual
character in a simple general equilibrium model. The
sovereign is interested in the surplus of revenue over
expenditure and therefore equates marginal revenue
to the marginal cost of hiring more government
workers.t
Findlay and Wilson view the state as a 'natural
monopoly', and the 'surplus' that the state maximises
is a sort of monopoly 'rent' that the sovereign can
enjoy. But they then postulate that the surplus
originally enjoyed purely by the sovereign attracts a
horde of office seekers anxious to get their hands on
some of it. A monarchial-type Leviathan may thus be
transformed into a bureaucratic Leviathan. A budget-
maximising hypothesis is then attributed to the
behaviour of the bureaucratic Leviathan.
At the other extreme from a Leviathan acting in an
autonomous fashion is the interpretation of the state
as a passive reflection of interest groups. Viewed in
principal-agent terms, citizens are the principals and
politicians the agents who are to conform to the
objectives of the principals. The principals are
especially interested in transfers - in policy issues of
who gets what.
2 On the contrary, as Robert Baies observes, 'recent experiences in
Africa and elsewhere make it clear thai the preference of
governments often bears little correspondence to any idealisation of
the public interest. Rather, governments engage in bureaucratic
accumulation and act so as to enhance the wealth and power of
those who derive their incomes from the public sector: they also act
on behalf of private factions, be they social classes, military cliques,
or ethnic groups. They engage in economic redistribution, often
from the poor to the rich and at the expense of economic growth.
These are central themes in policy formation in Africa and their
prominence serves to discredit any approach based on a conviction
that governments are agencies of the public interest' [Bates
1983:169].
In a similar analysis, LaI postulates that the sovereign would seek to
equate the marginal cost of public employees with the marginal tax
revenue from the output produced by the remaining workers [Ial
l986:l I].
19
Where elections matter, the politicians undertake
transfers so as to maximise the possibility of re-
election. Where the politicians worry about a take-
over, they may try to avoid contestability and deter
entrants by courting their support through favourable
measures of distribution.4
The modelling of a factional state has been especially
prominent in the explanation of agricultural policies.
As Michael Lipton has incisively emphasised, the
'urban bias' of governments results in the transfer of
surpluses from agriculture to the urban, industrial
sector. Where low prices are paid to farmers, urban
consumers benefit. Where state marketing boards
implicitly tax the rural sector, the government's
revenue from export sales is often used on non-traded
services supplied by the urban sector (government
employees in bureaucracies, the military, and state
industrial enterprises) [Lipton 1977].
Where governments subsidise inputs for farmers, the
benefits of these subsidies are appropriated by a
minority of large-scale farmers. Where an overvalued
exchange rate is maintained, domestic food producers
face higher levels of competition from inexpensive
foreign foodstuffs. And where import substitution
policies protect local industries, the prices of goods
that farmers consume are higher than world prices.
Analysing such relations between governments and
agricultural markets in Africa, Robert Bates concludes:
'Food policy in Africa appears to represent a form
of political settlement designed to bring peaceful
relations between African governments and their
urban constituents. It is a settlement whose costs
tend to be borne by the farmers.5 It is not only the
worker who cares about food prices. Employers
care about food prices because food is a wages
good; with higher food prices, wages rise and, all
else being equal, profits fall. . . When urban unrest
begins among food consumers, political discontent
often rapidly spreads to upper echelons of the
polity: to those whose incomes come from profits,
not wages, and to those in charge of major
bureaucracies. Political regimes that are unable to
supply low-cost food are seen as dangerously
incompetent and as failing to protect the interests
As Lai flotes. 'Even a revenuc-maximising predatory state is
unlikely to raise taxes to the level which reduces peasant incomes to
the subsistence level, as well before that the current controllers of
the multiproduct natural monopoly providing the public goods of
'law and order' and 'security', which is the stale, will lind that their
industry is contestable. The contestants could be either internal or
external rivals. The level of taxes which will be sustainable depends
upon the harriers to entry - including physical (geographical).
technological (military) as well as ideological (including religion) -
which allow the maximum 'natural' rent to he extracted by any
controller of the state' [LaI 1986:121].
Similar observations could be made for Latin American countries.
But in Asian countries - such as Malaysia. Indonesia. Korea,
Taiwan and Thailand - the governments have looked to the rural
sector as an important element of support [Sachs 1985:558-9].
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of key elements of the social order' [Bates
1983:169-70].
Although a political economy approach has been
applied most frequently to food price policy, we could
also interpret trade policy, stabilisation policy, or
balance of payments adjustments as the outcome of
political pressures extended by various interest
groups. We should also analyse the activities of the
public bureaucracy in order to illuminate why
governments do what they do. The political economy
of public bureaucracies merits special emphasis
because of the large public sector, extensive public
projects, and state owned enterprises in a developing
country. It is necessary to capture both the
bureaucratic and political dimenstons of administrative
performance.
The new economics of organisation can help do this by
allowing us to incorporate a contractual perspective
on organisational relationships, a focus on hierarchical
control, and formal analysis via principal-agent
models, To minimise problems of adverse selection
and moral hazard it is rational for a government to
internalise contracting relationships by extending its
own bureaucracy instead of engaging in market-like
transactions with private contractors,
The administration of government regulations acquires
particular importance when markets do not clear and
there are disequilibrium prices, for then bureaucratic
allocation can grant favours, premia, and rents to
particular individuals or groups. Through these
administratively conferred benefits or through the
threat of sanctions, bureaucratic controls can be used
to organise political support and maintain the regime
in power.
These interpretations of the role of the state have the
merit of departing from the economist's usual notion
of a benevolent well-informed state acting in the
public interest. The actual behaviour of a government
is far from the economist's technocratic view of it
maximising a social welfare function subject to
resource and technological constraints, The political
economy perspective suggests that a more realistic
interpretation of why governments do what they do
can be based on the concepts of a political market,
government preferences, political resources, political
costs, political constraints, political risk aversion,
political loss aversion, and the demand for and supply
of policy outputs. Nonetheless, although this
approach introduces some political realism, its
neoclassical dimensions are overdone,
Limitations of the New Political Economy
Although the new political economy has opened one
or two windows in the black box of the state, it is still
quite limited - especially in its relevance for
developing countries, The neoclassical dimensions of
the new political economy are too narrow once we go
outside the liberal democratic state. Does the new
political economy apply when the LDC is not a
decentralised democratic state but instead a centralised
dictatorial or authoritarian state? Its major contri-
butions have been to the more developed countries in
which political participation is high, voters play a
major role, legislative bodies are also major actors,
and elections have importance. Does it apply when we
go beyond game theoretic or rational choice models?
Much of the new political economy is based on a
pluralist model in which public policy is the result of
the pressures placed upon decision makers by large
numbers of competing groups in society. The state
provides a more or less neutral institutional and
procedural framework in which conflicting groups
form coalitions, and policy change occurs because
different coalitions of interests manage to gain power
and impose their preferred solution on society.
This approach, however, tells us little about the actual
process of decision making and does not recognise any
independence for political leaders or policy makers to
shape alternatives. Moreover, the model has limited
transferability to most of the developing countries,
where:
interest aggregating structures tend to be weak.
Political parties, for example, may be more
important as mechanisms by which elites control
mass followings than as means by which interests
are articulated from below to government
leadership. This is particularly true in regimes in
which single or dominant parties direct the political
state. Elsewhere, parties may be vehicles for the
personal ambitions of individual politicians who
are divorced from any real commitment to
achieving goals beyond the acquisition of govern-
ment jobs and their distribution to loyal followers.
In other countries, technocratic military regimes
have abolished parties.
Interest groups may be similarly ineffective as
structures for presenting collective demands to
political leadership. Interest associations frequently
are captive organisations of ruling parties, exist
only at the sufferance of the government, or, like
parties, are formed for the single purpose of
protecting the political interests of their leadership
[Fjrequently there are few organisations in
existence that are capable of representing the
interests of broad categories of citizens and
formulating policies responsive to their particular
needs. Those few that are effective in this role tend
to be the creatures of wealthy and powerful groups
such as bankers, industrialists, and landowners
[Grindle 1980:16].
Another difficulty with the formal models of the new
political economy lies in the formulation of an
appropriate utility function. To say that the state
maximises its own utility is vacuous without further
specification, but the possible variety of utility
functions is extensive, and many cannot be predicted
but only identified ex post. Nor in view of external
pressures from overseas donors and international
agencies can it be said that the government always acts
according to its own interests and preferences.
Although different maximands may be considered,
new political economy always views government as
being a rational maximiser. But bounded rationality
may prevail, social-psychological elements in decision
making should be considered, and the government
may be 'satisficing' instead of optimising - in accord
with Hirschman's 'coping state'.
As opposed to the rationality hypothesis, we may
often find a behavioural perspective to be more
illuminating in incorporating concepts and hypotheses
from the older political economy. We might better
explain policy choices by understanding the role and
consequences of ideology, nationalism, classes, elites,
power, status, patron-client relations, political culture,
the structure of the state itself - its rules and
institutions. Beyond neoclassical political economy,
we should recognise the cultural, social and
psychological determinants of political change. By
neglecting this older perspective, the models of the
new political economy tend to be mathematically
frigid, with form dominating over substance, and
technique receiving more emphasis than empirical
relevance. Moreover, the models focus only on
decision-making with respect to policy choice. But as a
coalition precedent to that decision we should first
analyse the problem of agenda formation. In this
connection, Hirschman has distinguished between
'pressing' and autonomously 'chosen' problems.
Pressing problems are those 'that are forced on the
policy makers through pressure from injured or
interested outside parties'. Chosen problems are those
that decision makers 'have picked out of thin air' as a
result of their own perceptions and preferences.
Pressing problems are generally those in which a
perception of crisis is apparent [Hirschman
1963:254-335].
After the policy making decision there must also be
implementation. In the models of the new political
economy political activity is focused on the input stage
of the policy process, when interest groups influence
the policy making decision. In contrast, we should
recognise that in developing countries it is at the
output stage - at the stage of implementation and
enforcement - that a large portion of individual and
collective demand-making occurs, interests are
represented, and there is a resolution of conflict
[Grindle 1980:15-18].
Many of the most important policies established by
political elites involve distributive and redistributive
measures:
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In the context of very scarce resources, who gets
what and how much is of central concern to the
populace. In order to have any impact on decision
making, many in a developing country have found
the implementation phase of the policy process to
be particularly suited to their needs. In attempts to
acquire government goods and services, individuals
and groups find it especially rewarding to focus
their demand-making efforts on officials and
agencies empowered to distribute benefits, or on
politicians who may have influence over individual
allocations. The factions, patron-client linkages,
ethnic ties, and personal coalitions that are often
the basis of political activity are well suited to
making individualised demands on the bureaucratic
apparatus for the allocation of goods and services.
This means that the implementation process may
be the major arena in which individuals and groups
are able to pursue conflicting interests and compete
for access to scarce resources. It may even be the
principal nexus of the interaction between the
government and the citizenry, between officials
and their constituents [Grindle 1980:18-19].
Furthermore the credibility and sustainability of a
policy - attributes that are essential for policy reform
- are determined during the implementation phase. If
policy reform is to succeed, it is then that conflict,
resistance, and reversibility must be avoided. Since
political activity concentrates on the implementation
process, it is much more difficult to predict the efficacy
of policies than would be indicated by the new political
economy's confinement to decision making with
respect merely to the policy choice.
Given the inadequacy of the new political economy,
we must seek a more eclectic approach that combines
the old and new political economy. As an illustration
of this broader but necessarily more informal analysis,
let us now consider the behaviour of a developing
country's government with respect to trade policy, and
particularly its attraction to import substituting
industrialisation (IST).
Political Economy of Trade Policy
Development economists can certainly present
logically valid arguments for protection of import
substitution industries. There is merit to the infant
industry argument under certain conditions -
namely, the industry enjoys dynamic learning effects
that generate irreversible technological external
economies that cannot be captured by the protected
industry; the protection is limited in time; and the
protection enables the industry to realise sufficiently
lower costs such that the initial excess costs of the
industry will be repaid with an economic rate of return
equal to that earned on other investments.
There is also merit to protection arguments for
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industry when there is factor price disequilibrium in a
dual labour market such that the urban wage in
industry is greater than its social opportunity cost.
And if a country can exercise international market
power it might protect an import-competing industry
in order to improve its commodity terms of trade.
Rarely, however, has protection been instituted
because of these arguments, let alone applied by a
government in a technically correct fashion. In
contrast, protection in practice has been adopted for
reasons best explained through a political economy
perspective.
Trade policy is placed on the agenda as a pressing
problem. Balance of payments crises and the foreign
exchange constraint require the state to take some
action. As Hirschman expresses it:
the state loses its august character of a sovereign
pursuing its own objectives and initiating policies
to this end; rather, it is seen as coping, as best it can,
with a variety of emergencies, as constantly
plugging holes, and stopping a wheel from creaking
by applying a bit of grease in a hurry. Note that this
conception of the coping state goes farther than the
interest-group or bureaucratic-politics approaches;
these are still concerned with improving our
understanding of the state's action, rather than
with affirming that most of the time the state does
not act, but reacts [Hirschman 1975:389].
This pressing problem of the balance of payments also
becomes a privilege problem, in the sense of gaining
the attention of the policy maker, because it is
reinforced by the ideology of nationalism and the
appeal of economic independence. In a newly
emergent country the economics of development may
initially be an economics of discontent as the
politically independent government seeks to overcome
its colonial legacy, is attracted to the values of
modernisation, and the correlative policy of 'indus-
trialisation from the top downward'.
Governments also respond to political demands of
various interests. In some countries ISI is promoted by
a development coalition composed of industrialists,
urban wage earners, bureaucrats, and intellectuals. In
others, there is what Peter Evans calls a 'triple alliance'
of multinational corporations, elite local capital, and
the 'state bourgeoisie' [Evans 1979].
A formal model of lobbying by the capitalists has been
presented by Wellisz and Findlay (1984). The trade
regime is determined by the government, which has a
'restriction-formation function' reflecting its own
preferences - that is, its ideology, the self interests of
the governing group, public support considerations,
international obligations, etc. [.obbying expenditures
by pro- and anti-restriction factions enter the
restriction formation function as arguments and link
the political with the economic system. The political
system is viewed as an institutionalised market in
conflict resolution, and the endogenous tariffs that
emerge are the terms of trade reflecting the lower
organisational costs of the particularised (i.e.
protectionist) interests relative to the generalised (i.e.
free trade) interests [Magee 1984:46].
Economic resources are used to obtain politically
created rents. The restriction of manufacturing
imports raises the marginal product of labour in
manufacturing, leading to an increase in rent on
capital. For the government, a large or even the major
part of its revenues is derived from tariffs. An alliance
between a revenue-maximising or surplus-maximising
Leviathan and protection-seeking manufacturers
would then lead to a tariff that is higher than one
maximising revenue but that falls short of outright
prohibition. Tariffs can be interpreted as 'prices' that
clear political markets. In the presence of uncertainty,
however, the risk-avoiding manufacturers will prefer a
quota to a tariff. The government could then gain
revenue through the sale of import licences. Rarely,
however, is this done. Instead the government uses the
import-licensing regime to dispense patronage within
the ruling bureaucratic and political elite [Findlay and
Wellisz 1986:225-6].
In this model, the government tends to be soft - that
is, vulnerable to group pressures, and the trade
systems tend to be highly distorted. Under these
circumstances, 'favour seeking' flourishes. To the
extent that real resources are used in lobbying for
trade restrictions or in revenue or rent-seeking, such
activities may redistribute income within the economy,
imposing costs on some sectors and bringing benefits
to others. The general conclúsion is that high levels of
protection in LDCs. which are totally irrational in
terms of the conventional theory of trade and welfare,
are perfectly explicable in terms of the rational self-
interest of the relevant pressure groups in the economy
[Wellisz and Findlay 1984:148-9, 151].
Although protectionist policies may coincide with the
interests of dominant groups in society, this need not
be the result of aweak state being in fact dominated by
societal interests, but instead may be the result of the
conviction on the part of state elites that these policies
are the most feasible for achieving national
development, or it may be a result of interactions of
bargaining, conflict, and compromise between state
elites and social classes. Instead of clear domination of
the state by specific interests, policies may be
influenced by the development ideologies adopted by
state elites, or by the leadership ('political entrepre-
neurship') of specific individuals, or by the political
accommodations and bargains that are struck
between state elites and various social groupings
[Grindle 1986:18-19]. In societies with strong states,
the government may impose policy over the objection
of particularistic interests.
For a variety of reasons, therefore, a host of policies
have been adopted in an ad hoc and indiscriminate
fashion in a number of developing countries, resulting
in a restrictive trade regime that is quite different from
an economically rational system of protection. For a
Leviathan that seeks revenue, tariffs appeal. But high
tariffs or quantitative restrictions are also imposed on
imports of the final commodity, whereas intermediate
inputs have low or no tariffs, thereby giving high
effective rates of protection on the domestic value
added. The final assembly of imported components
may also be subsidised by low rates of interest, easy
access to credit, foreign exchange allowances,
provision of industrial estates, low public utility rates,
and favourable tax allowances. At the same time, the
subsidisation of the import competing industries tends
to be embedded in a general environment of inflation
and the maintenance of an overvalued exchange rate
that becomes a covert way to tax the agricultural
sector.
Whether weak or strong, governments have not
adopted the first best policies in the neoclassical policy
hierarchy. From the syndrome of policies associated
with ISI, profits in local currency and rents have been
high even though the domestic resource cost is
excessive and domestic value added may even be
negative at world prices. At the same time, inequalities
in income distribution have been aggravated, and
employment creation in the urban import replacement
industrial sector has not kept pace with rural-urban
migration. Overvalued exchange rates have encouraged
capital flight, and foreign borrowing by governments
have often gone to finance the private sector's
accumulation of foreign assets, rather than to an
increase in export capacity: the foreign exchange
constraint has not been relaxed.
For some countries a turnaround from iST to export
promotion (EP) has occurred after the first easy stage
of import substitution. For purposes of policy
appraisal it is important to consider why this
turnaround occurs: it is not simply because of laissez
faire on the part of the government, for export led
development has generally been state-led. True,
economists have certainly emphasised the deficiencies
and adverse effects of ISI. Their advice has been
effective at some times in some countries,6 but to bear
fruit their ideas have to fall on fertile ground: there
were other reasons for the turnaround in policy
making.
Actual experience may itself be more telling than
neoclassical prescriptions. As Bhagwati observes,
'Many developing countries learned [the policy
lessons] the hard way; by following iST policies too
long and seeing the fortunate few pursuing the EP
strategy do much better. Perhaps learning by others'
For the substantial influence of economists on new trade policies in
Tuiwin in the 1950s. see Little 1979:474-5.
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doing and one's own undoing is the most common
form of education!' [Bhagwati 1988:41]. There is
indeed an international demonstration effect in
government policies and some countries may simply
import and imitate the policies practised in other
countries. Under international leverage through the
elites of the World Bank, IMF, or OECD there may
also be some suasion to import the EP policies.
In a formal sense, we can of course say that a
government adopts EP policies when the costs to the
government of not doing so become excessive. In this
connection, a major reason for the shift to EP lies in
the perception by the Leviathan state that its organic
interest in autonomy is better served by the outward-
orientation policy [Findlay 1986:21]. The IS! policy
eventually founders on the shortage of foreign
exchange as requirements for intermediate imports
and capital goods rise more rapidly than domestic
production can replace imports of final goods.
Foreign aid and more external borrowing become
necessary to relax the foreign exchange constraint.
Thus, instead of continuing along the ever-more
difficult path of IS!, why not turn to EP and capitalise
on the unprecedented world trade boom of the 1960s
and early 1970s? Diversification of export markets and
supply sources could actually ensure that increased
participation in the world economy, as measured by
higher trade rations, would result in less dependency
and more autonomy, contrary to dependency ideology
[Findlay 1986:22].
A switch to EP involves not only a change in trade
policies but also exchange rate adjustment and
stabilisation measures. The differing exchange and
trade regimes in Latin America and Asia bring out
another force contributing to the more effective EP
policies in Asia - namely, long-term differences in the
balance of power between urban and rural interests.
Latin American governments have found their most
important constituencies among urban workers and
capitalists. Trade restrictions tend to shift income
from the agricultural and mineral producing sectors
toward the industrial and service sectors. The relative
power of the agricultural sector has declined since the
Great Depression of the 1930s, and the agricultural
sector has been relatively weak, with peasants only
loosely organised. Moreover, political unrest is most
dangerous in the cities.
In contrast, governments in Asia have felt the pressing
need to win support of, or at least to appease, the
stronger rural sector (Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia,
Indonesia, Thailand).7 The link between rural
influence and export promotion is the first step in
instituting an export programme. But once export
promoting policies get under way, urban-industrial
exporters become their own lobbyists and eventually
This paragraph presents the argument of Jeffrey Sachs tsee Sachs:
1985: 350ff1.
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become the dominant political force in favour of an
undervalued exchange rate, with rural interests losing
their relative influence.
The switch to EP does not appear, however, to be a
function of any particular type of political regime: it
has occurred in regimes as different as those of South
Korea, Thailand, and Brazil (in the l960s). The policy
shift from ISI to EP has also taken place within
countries with essentially unchanged political regimes,
such as South Korea. On the other hand, IS! has
continually been pursued in some countries despite
radical differences and changes in their political
regimes - for example, for more than haIfa century,
in Egypt and Turkey (until 1980).
Conclusion
To conclude: some four decades ago the subject of
development was thrust upon economists. Since then
economists have had to respond with policy
prescriptions to solve pressing problems. Their ideas
have mattered - but my cause now is that
development economists should matter more. There
have been disappointments and disenchantment, and
the early optimism has gone. If development
economists are now to be more influential, the subject
of development economics must move beyond
neoclassical economics. And if an idea is to prevail as
the actual policy of a particular government, it must
obtain support from those who have political power.
Development economists must therefore open the
black box ofthe state. We cannot assume a benevolent
state acting in the public interest and equipped with
needed information, knowledge and policy instruments
to achieve a social welfare function or Pareto
efficiency. We should therefore give attention to the
new political economy's effort to endogenise the
policy maker and we should recognise some insights in
the analysis of public choice and collective choice.
But to explain policy choices we must also go beyond a
neoclassical analysis of policy-making to incorporate
elements of the older political economy and political
sociology, so as to have a richer view of the politics of
policy formation. Moreover, we must give as much
consideration to the process of agenda formation and
implementation as to the policy decision itself. From
this more comprehensive view of the policy making
process in practice, we might better understand how to
correct non-market failure and overcome resistance to
policy reform.
At a fundamental level, the challenge remains to
achieve Dudley Seers' objective of instituting interdis-
ciplinary studies that will yield relevant theories
translatable into effective policies. Since its founding
conference, IDS has mattered a great deal in making a
notable contribution in this direction. We should hope
that its next generation of development economists
will matter even more.
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